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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3696 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                                           
 v. 
 
JOSEPH TAMBONG OSANG, 
    Appellant                                 
 _____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(No. 1-13-cr-00028-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews  
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 25, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 10, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Osang appeals his sentence of eighteen months of imprisonment for wire 
fraud, and his attorney moves to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the following reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw 
and affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  Osang was involved in a “black money” scheme.  In such a scheme, the 
perpetrator claims to have possession of currency that is coated in a black paste or 
chemical, which can be removed to reveal usable bills.  The victim is then convinced to 
purchase the chemical for cleaning the bills along with a number of “black” bills, but in 
reality receives only black paper cut into the dimensions of U.S. currency.  In Osang’s 
version of the scheme, he claimed that regular currency was needed as part of the 
cleaning process, and attempted to induce his victim to provide $100,000 in exchange for 
a percentage of the bills that would be “cleaned.”  Osang’s intended victim in this case 
was, in reality, a cooperating witness, and Osang was arrested when he showed up to 
collect the money and “clean” the bills.  He was indicted for wire fraud on March 4, 2013 
and pled guilty on April 9, 2014.   
 At sentencing, the District Court applied an eight-level enhancement for the loss 
amount and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because Osang attempted 
to flee to Canada during the pendency of this criminal proceeding.  After a three-level 
deduction for acceptance of responsibility, Osang’s final offense level was calculated as 
fourteen, to which he did not object, and which resulted in an advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines range of fifteen to twenty-one months of imprisonment.  He was sentenced to 
eighteen months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 
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 Osang timely appealed his sentence.  His attorney has filed a motion to be relieved 
and a supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that 
there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.  Osang has filed his own informal 
supplemental brief.      
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 When counsel files a motion to withdraw under Anders we follow a two-step 
review process.  First, we consider whether counsel has adequately fulfilled the 
requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), which requires filing a brief, compliant 
with the requirement set forth in Anders to identify “anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  Second, we consider “whether 
an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  If our review discloses any arguable merit to 
the appeal, we appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing, and restore the 
case to the calendar.    
III. 
   Defense counsel raises the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Osang’s 
sentencing based on the loss amount used and the conviction’s immigration consequences 
as arguable bases for appeal.  In his informal brief, Osang adds arguments regarding the 
District Court’s consideration of other charged conduct, and his attorney’s alleged failure 
to object to a sentencing enhancement and to press the issue of Osang’s mental health.   
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 As to the loss amount, it is undisputed that Osang asked the cooperating witness 
for $100,000.  The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the loss amount is defined as “the 
greater of actual loss or intended loss.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A).  Intended loss 
includes the “pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense” even where 
that loss would have been “impossible or unlikely to occur,” as in a sting operation.  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii); see also United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 460 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“Intended loss refers to the defendant’s subjective expectation, not to the 
risk of loss to which he may have exposed his victims.”).  Thus, we agree that an appeal 
on this basis would be frivolous.   
 The next conceivable issue raised by the Anders brief is the length of the sentence 
and its effect on his immigration status.  He was required to be informed that a plea of 
guilty would subject him to the risk of deportation.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 374 (2010).  He was informed of the potential immigration consequences of his plea 
by the plea agreement, his attorney, and the District Judge at the plea colloquy.  An 
appeal on this basis would be frivolous as well. 
 To these considerations we add those raised by Osang in his informal brief.  Osang 
complains of the sentencing judge’s consideration of other conduct that he was charged 
with, but not convicted of.  He remained, however, in the lowest criminal history 
category and the sentencing judge indicated that he was not giving the conduct any 
weight in his consideration of the proper sentence.  Even assuming that this was in error, 
then, it was harmless as it did not affect Osang’s total sentence.  See United States v. 
Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a sentencing error is harmless if 
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it is “clear that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence 
imposed”). 
 Osang also objects to his attorney’s alleged failure to elaborate sufficiently on his 
mental health problems and to object to the two-level sentencing enhancement for 
obstruction of justice.  We do not generally review ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims under the Sixth Amendment on direct appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Olfano, 
503 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2007).  Moreover, Osang’s attorney raised the issue of his 
mental health at several points during the proceeding, Osang himself discussed it during 
the plea colloquy, and the record was sufficient to allow the District Court to consider 
Osang’s difficulties as part of his “history and characteristics.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  
 Any objection to the obstruction of justice enhancement would have been futile as 
well.  The Guideline includes “escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial 
or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding” as 
“covered conduct.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E).  Osang’s attempt to flee to Canada 
falls squarely within the Guideline.  See United States v. Abuhouran, 162 F.3d 230, 234 
(3d Cir. 1998) (upholding application of enhancement where the defendant on bail cut his 
electronic monitoring device and attempted to flee the country).   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
